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Abstract 
ISS GN&C - First Year Surprises 
Source of Acquisition 
ASA Johnson Space Center 
Assembly of the Internationa l Space Station (ISS) began in late 1998 with the joining of the first two US and 
Russ ian elements. For more than two years, the outpost wa served by two Russian Guidance, Navigation , and 
Control (GN&C) systems. The stat ion requires orbital translation and attitude contro l functions for its 100+ 
configurat ions, from the nascent two-module stati on to the half million kilogram completed station owned and 
operated by seventeen nations. With the launch of the US Laboratory module in February 200 1, the integration of 
the US GN&C system with its Russian counterpart la id the foundation for such a robust system. 
In its fir t year of combined operati on, the ISS GN&C system ha performed adm irably, even better than many 
expected, but there have been surpri ses. Loss of command capabili ty , 10 s of communication between segments, a 
contro l system fo rce-fight, and "non-propulsive vents" that weren't - such events have repeated ly underscored the 
importance of thorough program integrati on, testing, and operati on, both across subsystem boundaries and across 
internati onal borders . 
ISS Today 
The ISS program is a world partnership with contributions from 17 member nations. Currently measuring more than 
50m by 70m, with a mass of 135 ,000 kg, it is already the largest space structure ever built. Upon completi on, the 
crew complement will be expanded from the current three to even, utilizing five dedicated pressurized laboratory 
modules. The planned lifetime of ISS is 15 years, although thi s may be extended. The integrated GN&C system 
architecture has been designed to provide robust contro l capabi lity for over 100 configurations during the build 
phase, including tolerance of a broad range of flexible bending modes of the changing station structure, visiting 
vehicles, active robotic elements, and diverse flight att itudes. 
GN&C System Overview 
The integrated ISS GN&C sy tern is composed of two distinct GN&C ystems , one in the Russ ian Segment (RS ) 
and the other in the US segment. In addition, the GN&C system of visiting Progress cargo spacecraft are slaved to 
the RS GN&C sy tern when docked to the ISS. T he ISS GN&C functions can also be augmented by the GN&C 
sy terns of visit ing Space Shuttle Orbiters, and in cases of extreme need , by that of Soyuz crew transfer vehicles 
which serve as the station crew' s lifeboat. In the future, the European Autonomous Tran fer Vehicle (ATV) G &C 
system wi ll also be integrated with the RS system in the same manner as the Progress veh icle i today. 
Figure I shows the top level arch itecture of the Integrated ISS GN&C system. Alone, both the US and RS GN&C 
system have redundancy of sen ors and effectors . Together, that redundancy is several layers deep . 
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Figure I . ISS GN&C System Architecture, Stage 8A, April 2002. 
The RS GN&C system provides the nav igati on functions of state, attitude, and time determinati on, and pointing 
support for antennae and so lar arrays. It also provides the control functions of translat ion (orb it correction and 
debris avoidance) and propulsive attitude contro l. The US GN&C system prov ide the same navigation functions , 
as well as on-board mass property determination to account for pay loads being moved by station robotic 
mechanisms. It also provides the ISS with non-propul sive attitude contro l by means of four Control Moment 
Gyroscopes (CMGs). When these two systems are operated together, naviga ti on data exchange provides for 
enhanced fault detecti on and redundancy. Intersegment thruster fi ring reque ts provide for US CMG desaturat ion 
and increased control authority. Figure 2 shows the major GN&C data exchanges. Figure 3 shows the locati on of 
GN&C e lements on the Stage 8A configuration, as it will be in April 2002. 
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Figure 2. ISS GN&C Data Exchange Interface. 
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F igure 3. ISS G &C E lement Locations. 
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Since the introduction of Russ ia into the ISS partnership in 1993, G &C system integrati on has been accompli shed 
through technica l interchange meetings, regul ar telecons, and a eri es of exhaustive in tegrated software tests. Thi s 
process has included joint definition of requirements and interfaces , development of joint operating procedures and 
composition of integrated development, te t, and verificati on plan . 
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The primary RS GN&C system was launched in July 2000 on the Zvezda Service Module. With the launch and 
acti vati on of the US Laboratory in February 2001 , the link between US and RS GN&C systems was established. In 
April 2002, the US GN&C navigation sensors will be launched, completing the baseline integrated ISS GN&C 
system. 
System perfo rmance to date has been excellent. GN&C hardware and softw are has perfo rmed as adverti sed with 
very few issues raised. The non-propulsive attitude control functi on has been nearly fl awle s, resulting in lower 
prope ll ant usage than predicted pre-fli ght. Assessment of the benign nature of non-propulsive CMG attitude control 
has led to its support of mechanism deployments (so lar arrays, radi ators, etc.) usually re legated to free dri ft. 
However, the first year of operation was not without some surpri ses. 
Pointing Interruptions 
Within hours of US GN&C system acti vation, the engineering support team received its first surpri se. The US 
command and telemetry interface is provided via a data link thru the US S-band antenna. This antenna prov ides a 
high degree of communicati on coverage with Miss ion Control-Houston every orbit by re laying data thru the NASA 
Tracking and Data Relay Sate llite (TDRS). The US GN&C system pointing fun cti on uses a TDRS ephemeri s to 
determine the target satellite locati on, and , since the US navigati on Functi on will not be acti vated until April 2002, 
Ru ian position and attitude data is used to define the ISS locati on and orientati on. With thi s data, line-oF-sight 
(LOS) pointing vector are computed. Since the accuracy of the LOS vector is well under 10 and the antenna 
beam width is several degrees, the S-band antenna uses open loop poin ting. 
Upon system activati on, S-band communication was established without inc ident. However, a short time later, the 
antenna ceased tracking the satellite despite the continued fl ow of pointing data and no apparent mechanical issues 
with the antenna dri ve mechani m. A subtle change in the RS GN&C data at the time of antenna stoppage pointed 
to the cause. The communicati on system oftware was des igned, per requirement, to dri ve the antenna when 
receiving valid pointing data fro m GN&C, but not when rece iving invalid data. However, GN&C data quality 
indicators are trinary rather than binary fl ags . The pointing data may be labeled as valid , invalid , or deg raded. The 
degraded state is used by the GN&C system as a re lati ve accuracy quali f ier to aid in best signal selecti on when 
multi ple data ources are avail able. The US and RS fl ight control systems can operate nominally even when the 
pointing data is degraded . RS fli ght parameters specify everal condi tions fo r declaring Russ ian attitude data 
degraded. At thi s time, one uch condition was sati sfied. An attitude correcti on had not been perfo rmed within the 
las t seven hours. Although the attitude data was still quite accurate, once the e lapsed time had passed and thi s state 
transition had occurred, US antenna tracking ceased. Quick negoti ati ons wi th Rus ian GN&C speciali sts resulted in 
a new time threshold of 100 hours being uplinked, and US communicati ons were restored. Of course, the nex t US 
software release will modify the log ic fro m, "If valid , then point," to, "If not inva lid, then point." 
In a similar manner, the GN&C pointing functi on prov ides so lar data to photovoltaic array and radi ator ori entati on 
mechani sms. In addition to prov iding a solar LOS vector every second , the software also predicts sunri se and sunset 
events every 100 seconds. The US e lectr ical power system was designed to use the so lar data to optimize array 
pointing automatically, but fo r the two months prior to acti va ti on of the US G &C sy tem, US so lar array 
ori entati on was managed by the use of pos ition and rate setpoints. Once po inting data became ava il able, the auto-
track ing functi on was enabled. Operator then noticed th at the olar array would brie fl y stop sun tracki ng twice per 
orbit. Data quickl y revealed that thi s was OCC UlTing at sunri se and sunset, and the problem was traced to faul t 
detecti on log ic. The software monitored the GN&C data time in fo rmati on, and would reject data that was stal e. 
A fter a olar terminator event, the high rate array pointing software would ob erve that the "next" solar terminator 
event identified by GN&C data was in the pa t, due to the slower update rate of this info rmati on. Therefo re, the 
GN&C pointing data was deemed to be stale and not used, stopping the rotati on of the olar arrays. This s toppage 
would persist until the nex t 100 second data update was made, at which time the arrays would catch up to the so lar 
LOS . The effect on vehicle dynamic and power producti on has been neg li g ible, and the nex t software re lease will 
amend the fault detecti on log ic. 
Non-Propulsive Vents 
The ISS has a host of vents for dum ping both ga es and liquid . Some are regularly used vents, for such purposes as 
evacuating laboratory experiment chambers or re leas ing carbon diox ide crubbed fro m the tati on air suppl y. 
Deta iled analys i has been performed to veri fy that the dynamic di turbances caused by operati on of uch standard 
vents are compatible with the s tati on 's micrograv ity mode of operation. Other vents are e ither used fo r specific 
tran ient or contingency operati ons, such as venting a Pressuri zed Mating Adapter (PMA) after departure of a 
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visiting vehicle, or for relief valves during overpressure conditions. In most cases, the dynamic effects of these 
vents received less scrutiny since they would not be used during microgravity operations. In addition, most have 
been fitted with a non-propulsive "T" vent so there would be no re ultant force from their use. 
Four hours after the departure of the Orbiter that delivered the US GN&C system , the crew evacuated the 
atmosphere of the PMA on the nadir side of the US node module. This was common practi ce for humidity control 
in these elements once they are un powered. This was the first time that this venting had been performed under US 
non-propulsive attitude control; previously, thi s had been perfo rmed under propulsive control provided by the 
thrusters of the Orbiter or RS GN&C system. In order to provide complete ly non-propulsive attitude contro l, the US 
GN&C system uses a very low bandwidth controller in a mode called momentum management. In thi s mode, 
vehicle attitude moti ons are established to allow the control system to balance the external environmental torques 
about an equilibrium point while maintaining the momentum state of the CMGs within a bounded region. 
At the time of PMA venting, the stati on was under non-propulsive attitude control. Since the stati on was not in a 
micrograv ity reg ime, and the PMA atmosphere was to be vented thru a non-propulsive T-vent, analys i of the 
resultant dynamics had not been performed a priori. The GN&C team was surpri sed to observe an attitude excursion 
of 10° over the course of nine minutes, and the momentum manager requesting thruster f iring to desaturate the 
CMGs. The initial suspic ion was that one side of the T-vent was bl ocked, but there was no credible hypothes is fo r 
how that could have happened. It was also noted that while one of the two sides of the vent pointed to deep space, 
the other pointed roughl y towards the US port so lar array, shown as the vector ex iting the top of Figure 4. (This 
fi gure shows the Shuttle Orbiter below, but that vehicle had departed .) Although the array was nearl y 100 feet from 
the vent, since the array was nearl y broadside to the plume effluent, self impingement appeared likely. However, 
reconstruc tion of the di sturbance did not yield a supporting di sturbance fun cti on; an empiri ca lly recon tructed 
di sturbance function uggested another cause. Detail ed plume modeling was employed, verifying what the 
empi rical data suggested. Plume impingement was indeed the cause, but not upon the so lar array. The expanding 
effluent was actuall y grazing the skin of the Lab module on which the T-vent was mounted, producing a 
perpendi cul ar propul ive force. 
Figure 4 . US Lab Vacuum Re lief Vent Orienta ti on 
In addition to PMA evacuati on, some add iti onal vents that had not been assessed for the ir effect upon the non-
propulsive attitude contro l system were Orbiter cabin and docking ystem vents, used to support crew ex travehicul ar 
ac ti vities, Orbi ter Flash Evaporator System vents used for thermal contro l, and Progress vehic le prope l/ant resuppl y 
line vents, which are purged prior to departure of the vehicle. Such di sturbances have since been characteri zed and 
the operators have the di screti on to enable propulsive attitude contro l if the expected attitude di sturbance might 
interfere with station ub ystems or planned events. 
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Control without Command Capability 
The US Command and Control (C&C) computers provide the command and control interface between the ground 
and crew and all US subsystems, including GN&C. They also provide te lemetry data for insight into subsystem 
status. On 25 April 2001 , during the third visit of the Shuttle after US GN&C system activation, the three US C&C 
computers all went off-line. This event occurred while the US GN&C system was providing non-propulsive attitude 
contro l for the mated Shuttle/Station stack. 
The US GN&C system maintained attitude control in the blind fo r more than 32 hours, with its only active external 
interface being that to the RS GN&C computer, its source for navigation data. Therefore, the GN&C system could 
not be commanded, nor could its health or performance be observed directly . During thi s time, ISS GN&C 
engineers used Shuttle Inertial Measurement Unit data to gauge ISS control system performance. 
CMGIThruster Force Fight 
A benign transition of the priority assignment of the three US C&C computers was scheduled for Memori al Day 
weekend 2001. Such a transition results in a communication interruption of about 20 seconds across the in terface 
between the US and RS command computers. In order to verify that thi s transition would not impact the RS C&C 
computers, the procedure for the transition was validated by Russ ian system specialists in Moscow prior to the 
event. The US GN&C system was in its non-propul sive control mode at the time of transition. 
However, fo llowing procedure validation, a Russ ian speciajist added one additional step to the procedure to further 
enhance RS safing. Th is additional tep was executed three minutes pri or to the repri oriti zati on; at 10:42 GMT, 
Moscow Mis ion Control di sconnected the interface between the US and RS C&C computers. At GMT 10:45, the 
C&C computer reprioritization was performed. Because the interface between the US and RS C&C computer was 
not re-enabled, two minutes after the US C&C computer reprioriti zati on, RS fault detection software commanded 
the RS GN&C system to unconditionall y take control of ISS with attitude control thrusters. This safing reac tion was 
appropriate for a true US control y tem fai lure, but not for an intentional severing of the C&C interface. 
With no command interface to the US segment, the RS C&C computers could not reque t the US GN&C system to 
relinquish control. As the RS attitude control thru ters were fired to reduce the attitude motions that had been 
establi shed by the US momentum management controller, the US GN&C control system applied its CMG torque to 
oppose thi s unexpected ex ternal di turbance. A force-fight en ued. Within a minute, the thrusters had reduced the 
ISS attitude errors with in the RS GN&C system' allowable deadbands. The CMGs continued the force fi ght, 
mostly unnoti ced by the RS GN&C ystem since the propul sive system has an order of magnitude more control 
authority than the non-propulsive CMGs. Two minutes later, the CMGs saturated and the US GN&C system 
declared a 10 s of attitude control since it now had no control effectors, despite the fact that the attitude was being 
held perfectly by the RS GN&C system. Figure 5 shows the attitude errors and CMG torque during this time. 
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Figure 5. Attitude Error and CMG Control Torque during Force Fight. 
The crew reconnected the C&C computer inte rface 40 minutes later, and control was eventually transferred back to 
US GN&C. Since the US control system uses a low bandwidth , low torque contro ll er, there were no adverse effects 
o f thi s force fight, a ex isting afety studies had concluded. The cause was quickly traced to the insertion of the one 
additional procedure step which severed the US/RS C&C computer interface. Even with the inclusion of thi s step, 
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had bus fault detection been inhibited, the procedure wou ld have been completed without incident. The important 
point was that adding one additional step invalidated the completed procedure validation testing. 
Lessons and the Future 
These first year surprises illustrate the complexity of GN&C integrati on on such a large scale program. During 
program planning, trade were made regarding the appropriate level of integrated subsystem testing. Because ISS 
activation is accomplished over several years, not on a single launch , the f irst opportunity to integrate many 
elements is on-orbit. Exhau tive formal testing is performed for each subsystem. For GN&C, detailed forma l 
testi ng of the US and RS GN&C ystems was performed both independently and together. This has resulted in 
predictable on-orbit performance with few exceptions. On the other hand , the amount of inter-subsystem testing had 
to be managed to trade cost versus ri sk. As these surpri ses show, some is ue were not identified during te ting. 
But they al 0 how that those that were not detected were low risk. They have been accommodated by operational 
work-arounds until future software modifications can be made. 
Such a trade philosophy was al 0 applied to analyti cal veri fication. The ISS GN&C team analyzed all nominal 
operations and single fa ilure and contingency events that carri ed ri sk. Some events, such as con tingency vents, 
vents on visiting vehicles (where data must be acquired from completely independent US and Russian spacecraft 
programs), or US olar array stoppages, were characterized onl y after the fact. They have si nce been studied and 
guideline have been developed to add ress them in future operational planning. 
Operational procedure and approaches continue to be adjusted and improved as the International Partners learn to 
jointly operate this spacecraft. This includes daily planning of logistica l resources , crew time, and shared assets , 
such as fue l or communications bandwidth. However, a lesson that space programs have learned repeatedly , and 
ISS is no exception, is that no amount of testing will suffice if procedures are circum vented. Whether by intention 
or human error, this may occur from time to time. The GN&C ystem has to be capable of safely iso lating and 
recovering from these inadvertent even ts, as ISS has done so far. 
In the future, ISS GN&C system robustness will continue to increase. US GN&C senso rs being launched in April 
2002 will enhance nav igation system redundancy and capability. Additional software will expand fault detection 
and recovery capabilities as we ll as correct current deficiencies . The add ition of the European ATV to the ISS 
program will provide another option for fuel resupply and propul ive control. And through continued operation of 
this integrated GN&C system, teams from around the world will continue to learn to work together in space. 
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